Taxing Multinationals: A Fundamental Shift Is Under Way by Faccio, Tommaso & Gosh, J
Intereconomics 2021 | 2
62
Editorial
Taxing Multinationals: A Fundamental 
Shift Is Under Way
For too long, international institutions have failed to deal with one of the most toxic aspects of glo-
balisation: tax avoidance by multinational corporations. This has reduced governments’ abilities to 
address international challenges such as the global pandemic, climate change, forced migration 
and rising inequality. It has also taken away a tool to achieve equality and distributive justice and 
thereby diminished citizens’ trust in the social contract.
Shifting profi ts to tax havens, large companies deprive governments of at least $240 billion per 
year in fi scal revenues. The Global South is disproportionately affected because their revenue 
sources are more limited, so reliance on corporate tax receipts to fund public services is greater.
In a globalised and digital economy, multinationals operate through centrally managed business 
models, and their global profi ts are largely the result of their global operations. Yet current inter-
national tax rules, developed nearly a century ago, treat subsidiaries of multinationals as legally 
independent fi rms which trade between each other using “arm’s length” or normal commercial 
prices to transfer goods and services.
But such prices are not always easy to fi nd. Many markets are thin and dominated by the same 
multinationals, who then exploit this system to minimise their tax liability by shifting profi ts to ju-
risdictions with low or zero tax rates. This undermines the tax base of countries where real activi-
ties occur and, therefore, where the profi ts have been generated. These rules are also skewed in 
favour of rich countries because they help multinationals’ home countries get the biggest share of 
tax from global profi ts. This “transfer pricing” is exacerbated by tax competition to the point that 
the global average statutory corporate tax rate has fallen by more than half in three decades.
Following widespread public anger at tax avoidance scandals in 2012, the G20 mandated the 
OECD to establish the G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profi t Shifting Project in 2013, aimed at tack-
ling the issue. So far, reform proposals have fallen short of expectations. Comprehensive reforms 
have been hindered by dominant OECD member governments, which come to negotiations with 
the misplaced perception that national interest is served by protecting multinationals headquar-
tered in their own countries. This has prevailed over genuine, global public interest.
The negotiating process has nonetheless reached agreement that multinationals should be con-
sidered unitary businesses. This means that their worldwide profi ts should be taxed in line with 
their real activities in each country and allocated to different jurisdictions, based on a formula ac-
cording to the key factors that generate profi t: employment, sales and assets. Many states in the 
United States use a similar “formulary apportionment” system to determine their taxable shares of 
US corporate profi ts. In 2016, the EU Commission put forward a similar proposal for an EU Com-
mon Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, but it has not yet been approved by the European Council.
Formulary apportionment would remove the current artifi cial incentive for multinationals to shift 
reported income to low-tax locations. Tax liabilities, instead, would be allocated by measures of 
their real economic activity in each location. But the proposal currently being negotiated involves 
applying this to only a small share of a fi rm’s global profi ts (so-called “residual” rather than “rou-
tine” profi ts) and is mainly directed at mostly US-based highly digitalised multinationals. This is not 
suffi cient to address the problem.
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Instead, we need a more ambitious and comprehensive reform that replicates the US system at 
the international level, without distinction between digital and non-digital businesses. This would 
help to establish a more level playing fi eld, reduce distortions, limit opportunities for tax avoid-
ance, and provide certainty to multinationals and investors. To put an end to harmful tax competi-
tion between countries, this system should be supported by a global minimum tax on multination-
als so as to reduce the incentive for multinationals to shift profi ts to tax havens.
Until recently, negotiations on a global minimum tax were benchmarked by the existing US mini-
mum tax on US corporations’ foreign earnings (known as “GILTI”), which has a rate of 10.5%. As a 
result, public discourse centred around a possible minimum tax rate of around 12.5% (incidentally, 
the corporate tax rate in Ireland, one of the EU’s own tax havens). Such a low minimum tax rate 
could in fact over time become the global ceiling, in which case the laudable initiative to oblige 
multinationals to bear their fair share of taxes would end up doing the opposite.
Negotiations do not happen in a vacuum. The global pandemic has forced a fundamental rethink 
in many countries of the benefi ts of a race to the bottom in corporate tax rates. The new US ad-
ministration campaigned on a manifesto to increase corporation tax from 21% to 28% and to 
double the current rate of minimum tax to 21%. The UK government has just announced a plan to 
raise its main rate of corporation tax from 19% to 25% in 2023.
This shift refl ects a new understanding of the lack of positive association between corporation tax 
and investment decisions. The earlier belief that corporation tax cuts could help spur business 
investment has been contradicted by the reality that corporation tax decreases have failed to pro-
vide a step change in the level of capital investment.
This is true in the UK, where the corporation tax rate was cut from 30% before the global fi nancial 
crisis to the current rate of 19%; in India, where the base rate was reduced to 22% from 30% in 
2019; and the US, where the Trump Administration reduced the corporation tax rate from 35% to 
21% in 2017. In the case of the US, instead of spurring investment, the rate cut mainly ended up 
funding dividend payments and stock buybacks.
This lack of effect on investment should not come as a surprise, as corporate taxation is a tax on 
pure profi ts – also known as economic rents – and therefore, lowering or raising the rate has little 
effect on economic activity. Rents have been on the rise over the last decades, notably in the US, 
but also globally as a result of increased market concentration and monopoly/monopsony power. 
These have in turn been triggered by gaps in access to technology (fuelled by intellectual property 
rights) and a series of benefi ts and privileges not available to smaller fi rms. The increase of rents 
suggests that governments should consider progressive corporate taxes, with higher rates on 
larger fi rms (especially monopolies/oligopolies) and lower rates on smaller fi rms in highly competi-
tive sectors.
As companies return to profi tability post-crisis, this will allow governments to generate revenue 
without distorting investment. A more progressive corporate tax structure would also address ex-
cess profi ts enabled by crisis conditions, by raising tax revenues from companies that are thriving 
during the pandemic (such as some pharmaceutical and highly digitalised businesses).
This shift in thinking may make a strong global agreement on an effective minimum tax a possibil-
ity and encourage countries to start a virtuous race to the top. If G20 countries were to agree to 
impose a 25% minimum corporate tax on the global income of their multinational fi rms, more than 
90% of worldwide profi ts would automatically be taxed at 25% or more.
There is broad evidence of the need for fundamental reform in the international tax system, but it 
requires political will to move forward. Any outcome in the 2021 international negotiations must be 
seen as the fi rst step towards creating a genuinely fair international fi scal architecture.
